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Abstract
The focus of researchers, media and policy on doping in cycling is often limited to the
professional level of the sport. However, anti-doping test results since 2001 demonstrate that
banned substances are also used by US cyclists at lower levels of the sport, necessitating a
broader view of the patterns and motivations of substance use within the sport. In this article,
we describe and explain the doping culture that has emerged in domestic US cycling among
amateur and semi-professionals. Through analysis of records from sports governing bodies and
journalistic reports, we assess the range of violation types and discuss the detection and
punishing of riders who were not proven to have intended to cheat but became ‘‘collateral
damage’’ in the war on doping. We argue that the phenomenon of doping is more complex
than what has been shown to occur in elite sport, as it includes a wider variety of behaviours,
situations and motivations. We develop fresh insights by examining cases where doping has
been accidental, intrinsically motivated, non-performance enhancing or the result of prescribed
medical treatments banned by anti-doping authorities. Such trends call into question the
fairness of anti-doping measures, and we discuss the possibility of developing localised
solutions to testing and sanctioning amateur athletes.
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Introduction
The focus of policy, media and many academic discourses on
drugs in sport has been upon cheating and negative health
outcomes (Gleaves, 2010; Simon, 2004). These are the two
main underlying reasons for the funding and implementation
of anti-doping testing, and the subsequent legal and quasi-
legal process aimed at punishing the cheats. The development
of organised international anti-doping policy has been based
on these central tenets since the 1960s (Beamish & Ritchie,
2004; Dimeo, 2007; Hunt, Dimeo, & Jedlicka, 2012). More
recently, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) included a
third guideline known as the ‘‘spirit of sport’’. For a substance
or technique to be banned, it would have to contravene two of
these three: fair play, health of the athlete and the spirit of
sport (WADA, 2009).
Previous research on doping in cycling has focused on the
professional level (Mignon, 2003; Ohl, Fincoeur, Lentillon-
Kaestner, Defrance, & Brissonneau, 2013; Sefiha, 2012;
Waddington, 2000), while largely neglecting the lower
amateur levels of sport and masters competitors in higher
age categories. In this study, we focus on the cases of all
American cyclists, amateur and professional, who were
caught doping and sanctioned during the period 2001 and
summer 2014. The range of cases includes athletes whose
intentions to cheat others are not obvious, as athletes may
have used recreational drugs like cannabis, used medicines
that contained banned drugs without realising it, or bought
and used nutritional supplements contaminated with banned
substances. Taking a broader view of US cycling that includes
amateurs exposes patterns of doping behaviour beyond the
narrow perspective of a small number of professionals whose
motivations clearly lies with a desire for financial gain and
celebrity status (Backhouse, McKenna, Robinson, & Atkin,
2007; Laure & Reinsberger, 1995). Lentillon-Kaestner and
Carstairs (2010) noted doping may occur at any level of
competition, asking ‘‘What happens before cyclists become
professional?’’ (p. 336). To this we add an exploration of what
happens when cyclists are unlikely to ever become profes-
sional or when cyclists compete as older adults. In addition to
elite cases, we describe and explain the doping culture that
emerged in domestic US cycling among amateurs, those who
compete at the lower categories of cycling, and semi-
professionals, those who may win large races and prize
purses but who do not have contracts with the largest
professional teams.
The critical approach adopted here aims to analyse and
discuss the nature of policy in practice. We demonstrate the
variety of doping situations and critically assess the outcomes
of anti-doping against WADA’s stated purpose and the general
ideology underpinning anti-doping. The patterns that emerged
starkly contrasted with the policy and media-led demonisation
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of doping athletes and with common assumptions of extrin-
sically motivated cheating. These cases point to possible
trends in doping and raise new questions about the fairness
of current anti-doping policies.
Background
The United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) was formed
in 2000 as the trend globally was to move away from anti-
doping being embedded within organisations with a vested
interest in maintaining the integrity of their image, towards
independent organisations that would be judged by their
ability to protect ‘‘clean sport’’ (Hunt et al., 2012; Kamber,
2011). Thus, in parallel to the leadership shifting from
the International Olympic Commission (IOC) to WADA, the
American re-organisation took responsibility away from the
US Olympic Commission and established USADA. Similarly,
the situation within professional cycling had dramatically
altered after the 1998 Festina scandal, an event that brought
forward proposals for an independent global body. WADA
increased the pressure on the Union Cycliste Internationale
(UCI), not least because cycling at the top level had a
reputation for allowing doping to occur and not punishing
cyclists who did get caught with sufficient bans to act as a
deterrent (Hoberman, 2003; Møller, 2006; Waddington, 2000).
There had been some precedence of doping behaviours in
US cycling, such as the use of blood doping among the
Olympic team for the 1984 Los Angeles Games (Gleaves,
Llewellyn, & Lehrbach, 2014). Establishing the nature of the
doping culture within US cycling in the 1990s is challenging.
Even in the extensive evidence presented against Lance
Armstrong the point of origin for his doping decision is not
entirely clear, but some evidence would suggest it was in 1995
with Motorola (Hamilton & Coyle, 2012). However, Matt
DiCanio and Tyler Hamilton both explained that their
encounters with doping occurred only once they were estab-
lished within the professional European scene. For Hamilton,
this was the late 1990s. It was in 1997 he made the decision to
dope, and he argues that for most professionals of that time
period, the realisation that doping was a necessity would come
in their second year and their own decision would have to
be made in their third year (Hamilton & Coyle, 2012, p. 66).
We would propose, therefore, that the extent of doping within
the domestic context was relatively low in the late 1990s on the
basis that American professionals learned from European
doctors, and as we detail below, evidence of a doping culture
really emerges around the time that Lance Armstrong was
winning his seven consecutive Tour de France titles.
It should be noted here that it is almost impossible to say
with any certainty what the patterns of drug use were.
Evidence from testing and the eventual confessions of a small
number of professional dopers can offer some indications.
However, these are only partial insights. Even when higher
numbers of cyclists were caught, it may have been the result
of the development or refinement of tests for specific drugs,
rather than any specific pattern.
Many recent scholarly approaches to the study of doping in
sport aim to support anti-doping through improving under-
standing of the contexts of athletes’ lives and training,
psychological make-up and the processes through which they
are educated (Backhouse & McKenna, 2012; Morente-
Sa´nchez & Zabala, 2013; Ntoumanis, Ng, Barkoukis, &
Backhouse, 2014). There have recently been a significant
number of approaches to modelling the ‘‘doping decision’’,
and statistically testing the relevant variables (Bilard, Ninot,
& Hauw, 2011; Ntoumanis, Ng, Barkoukis, & Backhouse,
2013; Sas-Nowosielski & Swiatkowska, 2008; Tsorbatzoudis,
Rodafinos, Spiliopoulou, Barkoukis, & Lazuras, 2009). Some
of these studies have been funded by WADA with the explicit
remit to help the fight against drug misuse in sports.
While these studies can be credited for improving the
evidence base, there appears to be several unchallenged
assumptions: that the decision to ‘‘dope’’ firstly is a rational,
intentional and conscious decision to cheat (Hoff, 2012;
Overbye, Knudsen, & Pfister, 2013) that emerges from
inherent psychological traits (Bilard et al., 2011; Petro´czi &
Aidman, 2009) combined with environmental pressures
(Smith et al., 2010), secondly is perceived as deviant by
athletes and their entourage (Christiansen, 2005; Pitsch,
Emrich, & Klein, 2007), and lastly that anti-doping is a
legitimate and fair policy that functions to catch dopers and
deter potential dopers (Martin, Baron, & Gold, 2006;
Mazanov, Huybers, & Connor, 2011). However, it could be
more critically argued among this wealth of recent empirical
knowledge there has not yet been a study that shows the
variety of doping situations and describes patterns of doping
behaviour according to this variety, despite the availability of
information on every sanctioned athlete (Yonamine, Garcia,
& de Moraes Moreau, 2004). Dopers are not homogenous and
there is a significant conceptual and real difference between
someone who systematically dopes over a period of time, and
many innocuous doping situations (see Ramachandra et al.,
2012; Strelan & Boeckmann, 2006). The social groupings
affected by anti-doping are much more diverse than previous
studies have considered where the focus has been on the
extrinsically motivated elite and aspiring elite, male athletes
and their use or potential use of PEDs (Bloodworth &
McNamee, 2010; Christiansen, 2010; Outram & Stewart,
2015). This narrow focus has left gaps in the existing
research, overlooking patterns of behaviours, motivations and
situations occurring outside the upper reaches of the sport.
Beyond the level of the individual and their immediate
circumstances, some recent historical, sociological and policy
analyses of anti-doping have driven towards a more critical
deconstruction of ideological principles, common sense
claims, self-governance of international agencies and the
equity of policy decisions (Denham, 2011; Hanstad &
Waddington, 2009; Kayser & Broers, 2012; Stewart &
Smith, 2008; Straubel, 2008; Wiesing, 2011). Møller (2014)
has used the term ‘‘corrupt idealism’’ to frame his criticism of
anti-doping leaders who are willing to accept or indeed
promote unethical behaviour in order to support the ‘‘greater
good’’ of anti-doping. There are cases of athletes who likely
did not intend to violate anti-doping regulations, such as those
who unintentionally ingested a banned substance (Cox, 2014;
Pluim, 2008). There may be others who failed to acquire a
therapeutic use exemption (TUE) but were following orders
from their personal physician, risking a positive test and a
sanction (Fitch, 2013; Overbye & Wagner, 2013). However,
under WADA’s strict liability principle all athletes are held to
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account for the presence of any detected banned substance,
regardless of their intent (Cox, 2014). There are numerous
examples from a range of sports where athletes have been
punished for inadvertently breaking the rules. Thus, it may be
that the ‘‘war’’ on drugs in sport has been so heavily skewed
towards the claimed outcomes of catching cheats that
relatively innocent athletes who did not intend to enhance
performance (Pluim, 2008) are swept up, in a sense becoming
‘‘collateral damage’’ (Cox, 2014).
The critical approach adopted here therefore aims to
analyse and discuss the nature of policy in practice. We use a
case study to demonstrate the variety of doping situations and
critically assess the outcomes of anti-doping against WADA’s
stated purpose and the general ideology underpinning anti-
doping. The social groupings affected by anti-doping are
much more diverse than previous studies have considered
where the focus has been on elite, male athletes.
Evidence and methods
Data were collected in several ways. First, we utilised the on-
line records of the national governing body, USA Cycling,
and the USADA, the organisation that caught the US Postal
riders. We recorded details of all 88 sub-cases that resulted in
a sanction. In our collection, we included the type of test (in
or out of competition), where the test was administered, the
type and name of the substance the athlete tested positive for,
and the length of the competition ban imposed. Second, we
used information available through USA Cycling’s website
regarding cyclists’ race results and competitive history,
categories for racing and cycling discipline (i.e. track, road).
Though we do not present this data here, it was the basis for
identifying the range of case types we identify below. In some
instances, the athlete challenged the outcome through the
arbitration process. Where this is so, the full details and
decision are available through the USADA website and were
included in the analysis.
Third, we also recorded details from news reports of cases
that attracted mainstream media attention. Rather than ignore
those sub-cases often left out of mass media coverage for
lacking a newsworthy aspect, we sought to include these
hidden in plain sight accounts in our analysis. To this end, we
gathered information from online news sources, some of
which were connected to print media and some that are
exclusively web based. In most cases, these reports were
found in American cycling magazines such as VeloPress and
on websites reporting cycling news. We used Google to search
for each cyclists’ name. In the cases where the name search
returned multiple or unrelated results, we entered a second
search for the cyclists name with the word ‘‘doping’’. In each
case this returned at least one relevant result other than the
relevant USADA press release. Some cyclists had Wikipedia
pages, though information from these pages was used only
where the information source was cited and the source could
be confirmed. In cases outside of the widely covered elite
doping scandals there were generally few news pieces
available for each case. However, we agree with Laurendeau
and Moroz (2012) that ‘‘we might infer from the relatively
small number of articles that the ideas that they produce and
reproduce are so ‘commonsense’ as to generate little
controversy and, hence, little (public) discussion’’ (p. 387)
yet are useful for analysis. Many of these lesser-known cases
contained details about cyclists’ motivations and circum-
stances that contradict those most commonly discussed in the
literature on doping. As such, our findings provide correction
to the myopic view of doping within US cycling.
The news reports on each sub-case were collected and
analysed for details of any response to the test result by the
athlete, such as an admission or denial of intent, or for any
alternative explanation for the positive result. Often, the news
reports functioned to provide background and context for
several cases involving lesser or unknown amateur and master
cyclists. There are factual elements of each sub-case such as
the length of a sanction, drug type, location where the test was
conducted, age of the cyclist, etc., as well as descriptive and/
or subjective elements, including statements by cyclists to
sports journalists. We have analysed and presented the former
type of data, then used the latter type to contextualise and
highlight aspects of the patterns that emerged from the
official records. We approached these more descriptive data
with a sense of critical detachment, though inevitably used
our judgment to select key quotes and interpretations to build
an overarching argument.
There are, of course, limitations to this form of data
collection, not least the reliance on reporters and others to
produce reliable accounts. Especially with regard to the issue
of drugs in sport, sportspersons create particular forms of self-
presentation. Dopers who have not been caught claim to be
clean, those under suspicion divert blame elsewhere to
distract attention, those who are caught usually only admit
to the specific offence that has been proven, and even ‘‘full
confessions’’ cannot be trusted (Lamont-Mills & Christensen,
2008). Similarly, journalists and academic researchers who do
access relevant sources are trying to create a version of events
that fits dominant ideological and policy paradigms and
expectations of readers (Denham, 2011; Vetteniemi, 2010).
Therefore, rather than accepting any one account as the
singular truth of a case we cross-referenced journalistic
reports with all available information from USA Cycling,
USADA, and the CAS and took note of any inconsistencies or
contradictions in the journalistic accounts. Additionally, we
included only professional journalist accounts, and excluded
blogs, forums, and other user-generated material, as well as
opinion pieces pertaining to the sub-cases from the analysis.
Testing and doping culture: not just an elite problem
USADA’s first tranche of tests in 2000 produced only three
adverse analytical findings – all of these for ephedrine – and
the length of bans were zero, one and three months. However,
it would not be long before tests began to catch more
‘‘serious’’ cheats. Through the years from 2002 to 2014, there
was a gradual increase in the number of cyclists who were
caught trying to enhance their performance using testoster-
one, steroids, erythropoietin (EPO), growth hormone and
blood doping. These cyclists may have been caught through
blood or urine testing, but they may also have received
sanctions resulting from a violation such as refusal to submit
to a test or through their own admission. The total number of
sanctions in a single year peaked at 15 in 2012, the result of
402 A. D. Henning & P. Dimeo Drugs Educ Prev Pol, 2015; 22(5): 400–409
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 St
irl
ing
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
4:3
5 2
0 O
cto
be
r 2
01
5 
a long-term USADA investigation into the US Postal team.
As the US Postal team became more successful the doping
prevalent in European cycling ‘‘seeped’’ into the American
context, laying the foundation for a culture of doping to
emerge (Brewer, 2002; Lentillon-Kaestner & Carstairs, 2010;
Lentillon-Kaestner, Hagger, & Hardcastle, 2012; USADA,
2012). It seems clear that elite American cycling had, in a
broad sense, accepted the necessity of doping in order to
compete in major races against European teams. This
acceptance is evidenced by the extensive doping system
detailed in USADA’s Reasoned Decision against Lance
Armstrong (USADA, 2012). Lance Armstrong had won
several of the world’s top races, including the Tour de
France (1999–2005). USADA have shown that he was using
performance-enhancing drugs for all of those victories, and
this is supported by the testimony of many other top
American cyclists who also doped for part or all of this
time (USADA, 2012).
Yet, the testing system was not functioning sufficiently
well to catch the dopers. Of the 88 total sanctions from 2000
to 2014, in all types of cycling, the majority of positive tests
was for anabolic agents (42%). Other forms of deliberate
cheating were using peptide hormones such as EPO (26%)
and blood doping (5%). The more ambivalent categories are
stimulants (22%) that may or may not have been for
enhancing performance, and missing/refusing tests (11%).
A number were sanctioned for ‘‘non-analytical’’ reasons,
including the members of US Postal who were subpoenaed by
the federal investigators so had to confess. Kayle Leogrande’s
case is more subtle: he told his team’s soigneur he was
worried about being caught and she reported him to USADA,
suggesting that even the small number of known doping cases
were not always the result of good anti-doping control
mechanisms.
The endurance-boosting drug EPO had been popularised
through the 1990s, due to the perceived performance benefit
and lack of a test to detect usage (Lundby, Achman-Andersen,
Thomsen, Norgaard, & Robach, 2008, for development and
critique of test). Once such a test was developed in 2004, we
could see that domestic cyclists were familiar with the drug:
the first positive tests being Adham Sbeih (2004), Adam
Bergman (2005), Alvaro Tardaguila (2006) and Neal Schubel
(2006). These four cases also serve to demonstrate the breadth
of contexts. Sbeih was a national level competitor (USA
Cycling, 2004), Bergman was a member of the elite domestic
team Jelly Belly (Knapp, 2004), Tardaguila was an amateur
rider (USA Cycling, 2006) and Schubel was a low achiever at
masters level (Stokes, 2010). The Canadian woman who raced
to a successful level in the USA, Genevie`ve Jeanson, came to
admit using EPO for a period of 8 years, beginning when she
was 16 years old, from 1997 to 2005 (CBS Sports, 2007).
Since there was not a reliable test for EPO use until 2004, it is
quite possible that other cyclists were using it before this time,
and the lack of systematic testing makes it likely that these
cases were the unfortunate ones who were caught rather than
the only guilty parties. Moreover, the total number of tests
conducted relative to the increased number of competitive
cyclists combined with evidence from those who used EPO
and other drugs without being caught, suggest the prevalence
was significantly higher than the handful of positive cases.
The emergence of doping behaviours – the taking or
using of prohibited substances or methods of performance
enhancement – depends upon suppliers, and in turn entrepre-
neurial business-like suppliers were responding to demand
(Martin et al., 2006; Stewart & Smith, 2008). When Joe Papp
first became part of this history, he was a 32-year-old
moderately successful rider who tested positive for 6a-OH-
androstenedione and was banned for 2 years. He was then
given a lifetime ban in 2011 for distributing banned drugs
(Ford, 2011). Papp also sold banned drugs using a website.
Investigators discovered that Papp had a ‘‘client list’’ of 187
individuals, though not all of these were cyclists. The
consequences of further investigations into Papp’s customers
led to a number of confessions and sanctions, and also
provided some indication of wider doping among amateur and
semi-professional teams. In 2007, for example, Chuck Coyle
was given a two-year ban when USADA found a record of
purchases for EPO and insulin growth factor made on his
credit card from Papp’s website. However, Coyle responded
by claiming that some of his younger teammates had
borrowed his credit card and laptop computer, which was a
common practice in general, to buy the drugs (Rogers, 2010).
Other cases seem to indicate a developing pattern of PED
use among aspiring, non-elite cyclists. In 2001, semi-profes-
sional rider Duane Dickey tested positive for three banned
drugs: phentermine, boldenone and nandrolone (USA
Cycling, 2010). Dickey was later caught in possession of
EPO and banned for life. In 2002, a former member of US
Postal, Kirk O’Bee, tested positive for elevated testosterone
(Rogers, 2012). Female track cyclist, Tammy Thomas was
given a lifetime ban for a second offence after testing positive
for norbolethone in 2002 (Macur, 2004). These and other
similar cases demonstrate that drug use was indeed going on
within the ranks of non-professional cycling. These cases are
not directly linked to the 2012 US Postal case but are a
domestic sub-set of the doping culture that was disseminated
from the elite context through the lower levels of the sport.
Kayle Leogrande’s experience around the same time
period helps to illustrate how strongly a doping culture had
taken hold in American cycling, including among those
cyclists who were not quite at the uppermost echelons of the
sport. During the period 2004–2006, ‘‘other professionals’’
told him about doping (Lovett, 2012). He bought EPO from
Joe Papp in 2006, and had to self-experiment with dosages.
He joined the Rock Racing team in 2007 ‘‘where he was
introduced to former teammates of Lance Armstrong’s [and]
began to dope more regularly’’ (Ibid.). There is no direct
connection between Leogrande and US Postal, except that his
eventual admission assisted the federal investigation led by
Jeff Novitzky. Later, Travis Tygart, Chief Executive of
USADA, would say that Leogrande’s evidence played a
significant role in piecing together the evidence against US
Postal, perhaps because Leogrande speculated that doping
would be necessary to compete successfully in the top
European races (Ibid.). Moreover, the former professional
Floyd Landis gave evidence that the owner of the domestic
team, Rock Racing, ‘‘was involved in doping’’ (Ibid.).
Thus, we can see the emergence of doping as well as the
failings of anti-doping to stop this culture from developing.
Within a few years of the first EPO cases, doping had spread
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to amateur and masters levels such that organisers of mass
participation events felt the requirement to fund and organise
testing. In the New York Gran Fondo in 2012, two masters-
level riders tested positive for EPO (Dreier, 2012). Yet, the
authorities focused upon the top-level riders, in particular
Lance Armstrong, and have not created an adequate system
that would include regular, random in- and out-of-competition
testing for the recreational and master levels of cycling. The
critical outcomes of this policy strategy have been that
‘‘clean’’ riders are disadvantaged and most seriously com-
petitive riders would feel under pressure to take part in
doping. The concept of a ‘‘level playing field’’ is incongruous
here, not least because a wide range of factors influence
performance and that doping is an unknown contributing
factor to race results. Anti-doping policy did not serve to
protect the fairness of sport or indeed the spirit of sport.
As evidenced by the official doping cases, a sub-culture
developed where amateur and semi-professional cyclists came
to mimic the behaviours of their professional counterparts and
indulged in doping. While it is hard to be certain about this, it
may have been the case that a serious amateur competitor felt
the need to participate in doping for reasons of identity, status
and belonging within a social environment that respected and
emulated those in the higher echelons of the sport.
Collateral damage: recreational and unintentional
use of banned substances
While such cases pointed to a sub-culture of deliberate,
conscious cheating using the most ‘‘serious’’ of drugs, other
cases showed the dilemmatic nature of policy: that not all
‘‘dopers’’ are created equally. Anti-doping efforts aimed at
detecting those who seek to cheat may result in bans for
athletes who never intended such. For example, the three
ephedrine cases in 2000 were given shorter bans, suggesting
that the authorities did not deem them to be worthy of a full
sanction due to the relatively innocuous nature of the
substance and the likelihood that it was not intentionally
consumed. These are indicative of a wider pattern wherein the
intention to cheat is unsubstantiated yet competition bans still
apply. The Chuck Coyle episode highlights this, and he was
informed that the cost of appealing the decision was around
$20,000, so he had no choice but to accept it. Thus, the legal
process disadvantages amateur cyclists or lower paid semi-
professionals. Møller (2014) has recently argued that the
creation of a doping-specific legal process is problematic, and
does not give those charged with an offence the same legal
protection or opportunities to defend their case in comparison
to normal civic prosecutions. The use of the strict liability
principle is designed to counter any athletes’ appeals and puts
the onus fully of them to explain any substance found in their
sample. American cases such as Coyle and Armstrong show
how agencies can successfully pursue a charge on the basis
of non-scientific evidence, such as Coyle’s credit card
purchases. It is questionable whether a similar case would
be upheld under civic law when the defence has more scope to
challenge the nature of the prosecution’s evidence.
Nonetheless, we can say that Coyle’s unfortunate position of
being unable to mount an appeal shows how discriminatory
the legal process can be.
However, as in the 2003 cases of mountain bikers Kathi
Krause and Gary Houseman, the use of narcotics and
cannabis during competition is explicitly banned by the
anti-doping agencies. Both were caught using cannabis and
both were banned for a year. Houseman was also stripped of
his first place title in the UCI World Cup event (Albert, 2003).
Krause was aged 41 and had only finished 15th in the national
championships (USADA, 2003). It is a different conceptual
argument to propose that the use of drugs that are likely to
inhibit rather than enhance performance is not a form of
cheating or allow one competitor an advantage over another
(Henne, Koh, & McDermott, 2013). The social and moral
value of this regulation has been debated among sports
philosophers and sociologists, but WADA insists that recre-
ational drugs contravene the principle of the ‘‘spirit of sport’’
despite the problematic nature of that idea. Bans for non-
performance enhancing drugs do seem particularly harsh in
the context of US cycling when an unknown quantity of riders
doped to enhance performance without being caught, and
when the majority of the US Postal team was given reduced
bans of six months because they provided additional infor-
mation to assist the investigations. That is an unlikely option
for cyclists unable to offer such information, which is likely to
be the case for many at the amateur level.
In total, there have been 11 cases of recreational drug use.
However, these can be critically assessed on a number of
factors. As mentioned above, they are generally accepted to be
non-performance enhancing and the regulations an unneces-
sary intrusion into athletes’ private lives (Kayser, Mauron, &
Miah, 2007). Perhaps more importantly, the science behind
banning these drugs shows that cannabinoids can be present
in urine long after it has been consumed (varying depending
upon consumption habits and amount used). WADA changed
the threshold from 150 to 15 ng in 2013 because it was
recognised that this was a significant issue (WADA, 2013).
The rules state that consumption out-of-competition is
allowable but not in-competition. Under the pre-2013 rules,
the presence of metabolites in urine during an event period
might indicate usage occurring up to three weeks prior to the
test (Huestis, Mazzoni, & Rabin, 2011). Thus, not only is the
wider social context of banning recreational drug problem-
atic, but also within WADA’s very own rules. Even the
organisation’s first President Richard Pound said that an
athlete who used marijuana a month before competition was
likely to be detected, as was someone exposed to second-hand
marijuana smoke two weeks before an event (Miceli, 2013).
As such, there clearly are inconsistencies and inequalities
where innocent parties can end up sanctioned.
There have also been several cases where the substance
ingested appears to have come from a source unwittingly
consumed by the athlete. A case in point here is that of
23-year-old Amber Neben who was found to have 19-
norandrosterone in her sample in 2003. She had the resources
to take her appeal to the North American Court of Arbitration
for Sport (NACAS), and identified the source of the banned
substance to be from a contaminated supplement. The panel
agreed her positive test to be unintentional but still ruled that
she be sanctioned with a 6-month ban. Indeed, the transcrip-
tion of Neben’s arbitration decision shows the dilemmas
faced when confronted with an inadvertent case of doping
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(NACAS, 2003). The experts agreed that supplements were
normal, such as electrolyte drinks and glucose gels. They
even suggested not using supplements contravened the
‘‘stated purpose of the fight against doping, ‘to protect the
health of athletes’’’ (NACAS, 2003, p. 6) since these were
needed to maintain health, avoid fatigue and mental lapses
during races. Ironically, they cite the example of Lance
Armstrong to show that road racing is ‘‘gruelling and all too
often dangerous ð the demands placed on the body ð are
greater than most world-class athletes in other sports’’.
(NACAS, 2003, p. 6). The source of Neben’s banned
substance was not fully explicated but it was proposed that
it possibly came from a supplement bought from Hammer
Nutrition by USA Cycling coaches and distributed to the
team. What Neben’s appeal showed was potential negligence
on the part of those who had responsibility to protect her from
the risk of a positive test, and that all athletes are at risk of
inadvertently taking contaminated supplements, which inde-
pendent analyses have shown can contain banned substances
(Cohen, 2009; Cohen, Travis, & Venhuis, 2013). Though
USA Cycling was in the spotlight for this mistake and stood
accused of not providing any ‘‘real education’’ to athletes
about the ‘‘dangers of supplement contamination’’ (NACAS,
2003, p. 10), it remains the athlete who bears the brunt of the
legal process including potentially career and reputation
damaging sanctions (Amos, 2007).
Taken together, these examples suggest that anti-doping
regulations can have consequences for individuals whose
offence is relatively innocuous, perhaps even completely
unintentional, or even the result of negligence by their
coaches or national governing bodies. Yet there seems to be
an acceptance among anti-doping policy decision-makers that
there will be a degree of ‘‘collateral damage’’ in the pursuit of
the real cheats. It seems ironic that Lance Armstrong
negotiated his way around the anti-doping system for a
period of 8–10 years, that his guilty team-mates received a
light sanction and were allowed to return to the sport, yet
others have faced consequences for behaviours that are
completely different to the classic sense of doping as
intentional cheating.
Masters: relevance, therapeutic use, and anti-ageing
We have already mentioned several of the cases where older
cyclists used doping drugs. Perhaps it is not surprising when
highly competitive riders wish to retain some level of their
youthful competitive success. This appears to be the explan-
ation for such cases as that of Kenneth Williams who was
aged 42 when he tested positive for DHEA (Weislo, 2009). He
was a well-known and popular racer who wished to maintain
his performance levels. Forty-nine-year-old Todd Robertson
tested positive in 2011 in an out of competition test for
oxygen-enhancing peptide hormone (EPO), and admitted
using it for 2 years previously. For this he received a two-year
competition ban. In 2014, he was found to have the stimulant
modafinil in his sample and thus was banned for 8 years at age
51 for this second offence (USA Cycling, 2014). The second
offence appears to have been accidental, since he learned
from his first to be vigiliant, he said: ‘‘I still do not know
how or why a banned stimulant was found in my system’’
(USA Cycling, 2014). Interestingly, Robertson also admitted
using supplements, which shows how even those over 50
years old seek performance-enhancing substances, whether
legal or otherwise, to maintain their levels of competitiveness
across their life-cycle.
The New York Gran Fondo 2012 cases of David Anthony
(aged 45) and Gabriele Guarini (aged 49) brought this issue
some national attention when they were reported in the New
York Times (Dreier, 2012). However, Anthony’s case presents
a different scenario from life long competitors looking to
maintain competitiveness. He was a relative latecomer to
cycling but became – by his own admission – obsessed with
improving his ability and performances. He had won the New
York Gran Fondo for his age group, so had a degree of
success, but was never going to become a professional or reap
extrinsic rewards. However, he spoke of seeking ‘‘relevance’’
within his local cycling community (Ibid.). This raises
questions about identity among non-elite and older sports
men and women. Rather than the rewards being related to
prize-money, high salaries or sponsorship deals, their desire is
for localised recognition and to belong to a specific sub-
culture. Thus, the increasing popularity of cycling in the USA,
and the widening of race participation opportunities, has
helped to create ‘‘tribes’’ of serious recreational riders who
buy expensive equipment, learn about the science of training
and preparation, and perhaps have a personal coach. Within
this culture doping is transmitted from older or more
experienced cyclists to less experienced riders (Lentillon-
Kaestner & Carstairs, 2010), normalising doping as a rational
part of higher level competition (Sefiha, 2012). Anthony, and
no doubt others, took the next step towards the pseudo-
professionalisation of their hobby by using doping drugs
(Brewer, 2002). Though doping may have ‘‘seeped’’ into
domestic semi-professional teams through connections and
influences from elite riders, a further effect was to prompt
amateurs to dope.
The theme of older riders has another important dimension
related to the notion of collateral damage: the overlap of anti-
doping regulations and anti-ageing therapeutic drugs. An
example here is that of 62-year-old David LeDuc who was
caught and banned for 2 years in 2013 for using EPO,
testosterone and amphetamines. He did not manage to explain
the EPO, but the other drugs were prescribed by a doctor for
age-related compensation and for attention deficit disorder.
Similarly, Sloan Teeple, aged 42, was banned for 2 years for
using testosterone prescribed by a doctor for therapeutic
reasons, but he had not received a TUE.
Other evidence points to the challenges associated with the
overlap between anti-ageing therapies and older cyclists.
A more publicly discussed case (but not one that led to a
sanction) was that of Jeff Hammond (Beaudin, 2013) who was
a low-level amateur category 4 cyclist, aged 58. In order to
treat hypogonadism and low bone density he uses supple-
mental testosterone prescribed by a doctor. When he
contacted USADA to request a TUE he was denied, in
effect being told to either stop racing or stop medicating.
A letter from USADA informed him that his TUE was denied
because his use was to treat a functional disorder without
demonstrating the specific root cause of his hypogonadism:
‘‘Justification for the use of testosterone must meet the
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standard of demonstrating an organic cause of androgen
deficiency/male hypogonadism. A diagnosis based simply on
a functional disorder does not meet this standard ð rather
functional diagnoses often focus solely on low testosterone
and generalized symptoms’’ (cited in Beaudin, 2013). Though
Hammond’s testosterone therapy has successfully restored his
energy levels to where he feels normal, the lack of a TUE
prevents him from racing. Hammond’s analysis cut to the core
of the anti-doping policy challenge here: ‘‘They’re treating us
like 20-year old Olympians. Something that’s considered a
performance-enhancing drug for an 18-year-old may be a
necessary life-saving medication for a senior athlete. I think
it’s very unfair’’ (cited in Beaudin, 2013). It was reported at
this time that USADA had (in 2012) received 409 requests
for TUEs, of which 52 were for anabolic agents such as
testosterone. The science director for USADA, Matthew
Fedoruk said: ‘‘we’re seeing more athletes that are at masters
level realising that they were perhaps taking a prohibited
substance’’ (cited in Beaudin, 2013).
There is a certain irony to the risk of running afoul of a
policy designed to protect health by using a substance that a
doctor agrees is for health protection. Joe Papp claimed that
many of his clients were in this older age group. Another
source of information on this subject is Andrew Tilin’s (2011)
self-experiment that formed the basis of his 2011 book The
Doper Next Door: My Strange and Scandalous Year on
Performance Enhancing Drugs. Tilin had interviewed Papp
for VeloNews and subsequently sought other sources of
doping products. As a male over 40 he found many clinics
willing to support his ‘‘hormone therapy’’ treatment even
when he admitted to the advisors that he intended to use these
to improve his cycling. He showed that the anti-ageing
industry had grown to significant proportions – valued in the
billions of dollars annually, its leading proponents had
become millionaires. It seems that the confluence of cycling’s
popularity with anti-aging opportunities, and the pressures to
promote ‘‘clean sport’’, has created a ‘‘perfect storm’’ of
older riders who wish to maintain youthful vigour finding
themselves punished and marginalised (Hoberman, 2005;
Lopez, 2011).
Of course, many other cyclists may take the view that they
are unlikely to be podium finishers in events that have testing
procedures so therefore may simply continue with their
medical prescription regimes. To avoid such cases becoming
further examples of collateral damage of anti-doping efforts,
addressing ‘‘doping’’ requires a different approach to those
presented in studies of high level professional sports. The
motivation to take a banned substance may be purely medical,
or part of strategy to reduce the effects of the ageing process.
There is not the motivation to win money or fame. The
deterrents may also be fewer as there is little risk of getting
caught, and a two-year sanction for a cyclist over the age of
40 may not seem like a particularly onerous punishment,
especially for those for whom cycling is merely a hobby.
Rather than the extrinsic motivations often provided as the
main rationale for doping, the cases of amateur cyclists
demonstrate that the reasons for using banned substances are
varied and may be unrelated to any perceived sports reward.
Nonetheless, if doping behaviours are on the increase among
a wider population with variable access to medical expertise,
then a potentially significant public health issue may be
emerging (Sjo¨qvist, Garle, & Rane, 2008).
Localised anti-doping: testing’s new frontier?
The prevalence of doping with amateur ranks and competi-
tions may be an unknown quantity but there has been
sufficient anecdotal evidence to prompt grassroots organisa-
tions to develop their own anti-doping programmes (Burns,
2014). Partly, the basis for this is the failure of USADA to
provide sufficient levels of testing to deter doping. However,
USA Cycling has committed funding of $270,000 to cover
professional and amateur events. The latter is on the condition
that local cycling associations can match fund the costs
involved, for which the full costs are $3500 for a single day
event and $7000 for two days. By January 2014, 16 local
organisations, comprising 70% of USA Cycling’s membership
had joined the programme (Burns, 2014). By so doing, the
responsibility for initiating, planning and raising funds lies
with amateur cyclists whose desire is to protect their specific
local sports environment from doping. Working in collabor-
ation with USA Cycling to apply the WADA rules creates this
perhaps unique situation in which non-experts are collectively
imposing the rules designed for professionals upon them-
selves and their compatriots. This represents an interesting
innovation, that builds upon notions of discipline and (self)
surveillance that are integral to anti-doping (Henning, 2013),
but where the power to decide who is observed and
disciplined lies with a small group of well-organised cyclists
who aim to promulgate the ideologies and practices of
systematic anti-doping policy. These developments may be
unique, we do not know of other similar initiatives, and may
be a precursor of other forms of grassroots anti-doping. It
raises questions about decision-making, transparency and
trust, when those leading the anti-doping groups are poten-
tially open to bias in the course of targeting specific races and
riders. Moreover, given some of the problematic cases
outlined above, how would local organisational anti-doping
movements be sustainable if they were largely ‘‘catching’’
inadvertent dopers, older riders using prescription anti-ageing
drugs, and recreational drug users?
Conclusions
The commonly accepted assumption about and reasons for
doping by professionals do not necessarily hold true at the
lower levels of cycling. At these lower levels questions of
intent, knowledge, accident and lifestyle become central to
understanding banned substance use. Taken as a whole, these
cases call into question the basic tenets of health promotion,
fair play and spirit of sport underpinning anti-doping.
A broader and in-depth investigation into doping cases in
cycling reveals that current anti-doping policies can have
severe implications for non-professional cyclists. Though the
patterns of actual use are unclear, there are indications that
banned substances function as different practices at different
levels of the sport.
Current anti-doping test and ban efforts have had some
success detecting a number of cyclists using banned sub-
stances for performance enhancement, as evidenced by the
2012 decision and sanctions against members of the US
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Postal Service team. However, the relatively few anti-doping
victories have done little to prevent a doping culture from
taking root in US cycling. Professional cyclists competing on
the European circuit likely had to choose between acquiescing
to new performance demands by taking banned substances or
to race at a disadvantage against their doping counterparts.
During the same period anti-doping efforts were unable to
stymie the spread of doping at the elite level and doping
culture spread to lower levels of the sport. This ‘‘culture of
risk’’ around doping (Bette, 2004) was normalised in this
environment as a way to be competitive. Instead of being
viewed as a deviant practice doping might be viewed as a way
to fit into cycling culture and demonstrate one’s competitive
status. Thus, by the early 2000s testing results and discoveries
of distribution networks like the ‘‘Papp List’’ reveal that
doping was occurring at all levels of cycling, though the focus
remained on the elite cases where intentional doping
was likely.
This analysis has shown that while some aspirational non-
professionals did use PEDs with the intention of cheating,
many infractions by non-professional cyclists are likely the
result of recreational drug use not intended to aid perform-
ance, supplements containing banned substances, or doctor
prescribed medications or anti-ageing products. Anti-doping
regulations have not made allowances for these substances
despite the trends of decriminalisation and even legalisation
of cannabis, expanding markets for supplement and anti-
ageing products, and the increasing social acceptability of
each within wider society. The strict liability principle leaves
little room for explaining innocuous or incidental use of
banned substances, as presence immediately equals guilt
regardless of intent. However, the time and financial costs of
appealing a ruling may act as a disincentive to challenging a
positive test for many amateurs. The low number of appeals
by non-professionals has resulted in a situation where
professional riders engaged in intentional, systematic doping
serve lighter bans than their amateur counterparts. As such,
the unintentional or recreational use of a banned substance
can result in a relatively innocent cyclist becoming an
incidental casualty in the war on doping, a situation that
seemingly runs afoul of the notions of fairness and spirit of
sport that anti-doping policies are meant to foster.
These problems are further compounded by the problem-
atic TUE system under which athletes may be denied a waiver
to use a medically prescribed banned substance while actively
competing. In glaring contradiction to the principle of health
promotion, some athletes seeking to comply with anti-doping
regulations are effectively told to decide between taking a
substance that may be medically necessary or stop competing.
It is perhaps unsurprising that riders may forgo the process
altogether, taking their chances at being asked to submit for
a test.
One innovative outcome has been the emergence of
localised anti-doping, which aims to focus on reducing
cheating through use of performance-enhancing drugs.
However, if the established expertise of (inter)national anti-
doping agencies cannot address the extent of doping but
creates innocent victims in pursuit of that failed ambition,
what hope is there for community groups forced to follow
WADA guidelines? There is perhaps an opportunity for
implementing standards different from those aimed at
professionals and that take local lifestyles and the variety of
drug use into account. If such a model for volunteer anti-
doping could be established, almost like a ‘‘2nd tier’’ doping
control, then groups in other sports and other countries may
help forge a closer link between anti-doping idealism and
athlete behaviour. Rather than relying on the national-level
USADA and NACAS to decide exemptions and hear appeals,
localised anti-doping groups could take governance in their
own hands. Local groups could set up low or no-cost
arbitration programs to allow athletes to appeal or explain
specific situations, such as Amber Neben’s tainted supple-
ment case or Jeff Hammond’s therapeutic testosterone use.
Carrying out these functions themselves, in tandem with
localised testing, these grassroots anti-doping groups may
allow them to correct some of the injustices that result from
the current centralised anti-doping system. Thus behind the
headlines of US Postal and Lance Armstrong may lie a form
of anti-doping with the potential for changing policy and
engaging all athletes in a realistic approach to ‘‘clean sport’’.
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